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Abstract 
 
Due to the non-retroactivity of the framework for the protection of cultural property, 
Indigenous peoples are left without a claim under international law for the repatriation of 
a vast bulk of their traditional property.  The international community has responded to 
this situation by developing such a right in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This article examines this right to repatriation of cultural 
property as understood in the Declaration through the lenses of both the regimes for the 
protection of cultural property and the broader human rights framework.  Ultimately, it 
demonstrates it is an unqualified right in that it necessarily fails to balance the interests of 
the parties involved in cultural property disputes by ignoring the interests of current 
owners of cultural property.  In turn, such an absolute right works an injustice which is 
out of step with the broader human rights regime. Rather, it is the existing human rights 
framework that strikes the appropriate balance between Indigenous demands for redress 
and the broader concerns of justice that permeate this framework.   
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Introduction 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property [UNESCO Convention] serves as 
the principal instrument that controls the international framework for the protection of 
cultural property.  Cultural property ‘means property which, on religious or secular 
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science…’ (UNESCO Convention 1970: art. 1). 
Under this framework, repatriation is trigger by either the illegal export (UNESCO 
Convention 1970: arts. 7(a) and (b)(ii)) or theft (UNESCO Convention 1970: arts. 7(b)(i) 
and (b)(ii)) of cultural property.  However, this regime is significantly limited by the 
principle of non-retroactivity.  Non-retroactivity provides that the provisions of a treaty 
‘do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty…’ (Vienna Convention 
1969: art. 28).  It is this norm of international law that creates an insurmountable obstacle 
to the increasing requests by Indigenous peoplesi for the repatriation of their traditional 
property at the international level, as the vast bulk of this property left their possession 
long before the UNESCO Convention came into effect in 1972. 
With the reality of this shortcoming in mind, many Indigenous peoples have 
turned to other avenues such as human rights to help secure the repatriation of their 
cultural property.  Hearing these voices, over the past thirty years the international 
community has sought to draft and include such a right as part of a broader effort to 
increase the rights and protections of Indigenous peoples under international law. 
Recently, the fruit of these efforts has been borne in the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  In turn, this article examines this right to the 
repatriation of cultural property as secured in the Declaration through the lenses of both 
the regimes for the protection of cultural property and the broader human rights 
framework and ultimately concludes with a proposal for an alternative means to secure 
the repatriation of cultural property for Indigenous peoples. 
 
The Article 11 Right to the Repatriation of Cultural Property as secured in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
Despite claims that the Declaration does not call for the creation of any new 
human rights, (Mokhiber 2007) it clearly does.  Specifically, Article 11 of the Declaration 
provides an absolute and unfettered right to the repatriation of cultural propertyii that 
neither the present human rights regime nor the aforementioned international framework 
for the protection of cultural property offers.  In particular, this right proves absolute in 
that it does not engage in a balancing of interests; the interests of Indigenous peoples in 
their traditional cultural property versus the interests of current owners of this property.  
Rather, it only considers the interests of Indigenous peoples as it provides that they have 
the right to redress as concerns their cultural property full stop. Although Article 11 
makes reference to the restitution of cultural property as simply one means of redress, in 
practice it will serve as the most sought after and eventually the default means of redress 
in light of its special significance to many Indigenous peoples. As the Cultural Council of 
Marican Indians, Alaska Natives and Native Hawaiians noted, ‘[t]he topic of repatriation 
is important as it is difficult to teach our children to be proud of who they are as native 
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people if museums continue to believe that they can “own” the remains of our ancestors 
and our sacred objects’ (Xanthaki 2007: 221).   
If it is not clear on the language of Article 11 alone that it serves as an unqualified 
right to redress with repatriation ultimately as the only acceptable form, then it is most 
definitely clear on an examination of the placement of this article within the Declaration 
as a right of cultural integrity.iii  Cultural integrity refers to ‘the right of indigenous 
people to assert their identity through the unimpeded use of their own language, religion, 
and other distinctive cultural practices’ (Smelcer 2006: 313) (emphasis added).  Through 
its inclusion as part of this broader right of cultural integrity, the Declaration makes the 
repatriation of cultural property its corollary and so necessarily also unimpeded in its 
nature.  As cultural integrity has emerged as a norm of customary international law, 
(Smelcer 2006: 313-4) this alignment also then suggests the intention on the part of the 
Declaration for the right of repatriation to be considered unqualified; if not in its present 
form on its language alone, then eventually in its anticipated crystallisation into a right of 
customary law as a corollary of this principle.iv   
 
The Article 11 Right to the Repatriation of Cultural Property and the International 
Framework for the Protection of Cultural Property 
 
In terms of the international framework for the protection of cultural property, 
asserting an absolute right to repatriation mostly closely aligns itself with the theoretical 
underpinning of cultural nationalism.  Cultural nationalism involves thinking about 
cultural property: 
as part of a national cultural heritage. This gives nations a special interest, implies 
the attribution of national character to objects, independently of their location or 
ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and demands for the 
“repatriation” of cultural property (Merryman 2000b: 67).   
 
In turn, it justifies the retention of cultural property even at the cost of both limiting 
access to and the preservation of such property (Merryman 2000b: 84) with its emphasis 
on ‘national interests and values’ that supersedes all other interests in relation to such 
property (Merryman 2000a: 53).  However, this understanding of cultural property that an 
unqualified right to repatriation suggests in Article 11, though in terms of Indigenous 
rather than national character, conflicts with the concept of cultural property that the 
preamble to the Declaration suggests.  The preamble affirms that ‘all peoples contribute 
to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common 
heritage of humankind’ (Declaration 2007: preamble) (emphasis added).  In terms of the 
cultural property debate, this affirmation is closely aligned rather with the concept of 
cultural internationalism.  Cultural internationalism involves ‘thinking about cultural 
property… as components of a common human culture, whatever their places of origin or 
present location, independent of property rights or national jurisdiction’ (Merryman 
2000b: 66-7) (emphasis added).  Flowing from this way of thinking about cultural 
property, internationalists argue that the preservation of and access to cultural property is 
enhanced if an object is located in a museum in a major city which may be outside of the 
State of origin of such property.  In addition, from an internationalist perspective, 
preservation also justifies both the removal of cultural property from its place of origin 
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for protective reasons such as in cases of looting from archaeological sites, war or 
pollution (Merryman 2000b: 84).  Moreover, it supports a policy of retention by current 
museums to prevent any damage that may occur as a result of the return of the property to 
its place of origin (Merryman 2000a: 59).  Not surprisingly, cultural internationalism 
most notably then also frequently supports a policy of flat denial for demands for the 
repatriation of cultural property. 
 
The Article 11 Right to the Repatriation of Cultural Property and the Broader 
International Human Rights Framework  
 
In terms of the broader international framework of human rights, an absolute right 
to the repatriation of cultural property as understood by the Declaration proves 
unacceptable as it ignores the interests of current owners of cultural property which 
necessarily works injustice which is out of step with this broader regime.  Specifically, 
very few rights under the human rights regime prove absolute other than the right to life.  
Indeed, many of the rights included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights [ICCPR] are normally subject to proportionate limitations. Even the Declaration 
itself would recognize this as working an unacceptable situation.v   However, this does 
not suggest that broader international framework of human rights has nothing to offer 
Indigenous peoples in their efforts to secure the repatriation of cultural property. Rather, 
there already exists within this framework a number of rights that could secure the 
repatriation of such property for Indigenous peoples.  
In particular, Article 27 vi of the ICCPR offers Indigenous peoples a way to secure the 
repatriation of cultural property as understood by Article 11 of the Declaration but in a 
more balanced fashion which has the potential to meet the interests of both Indigenous 
peoples and current owners of cultural property as a brief examination of its case law 
demonstrates. For instance in the Ominayak Case, the HRC found that when Canada 
allowed the Province of Alberta to expropriate land to which an Indigenous group had a 
strong affiliation that this expropriation, in light of historical inequities, ‘threaten[ed] the 
way of life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band and [so] constitute[d] a violation of 
Article 27 so long as [it] continue[d]’ (at para. 33).  Although the HRC agreed that 
Canada rectified the situation by providing compensation for the loss of land, the 
Committee has indicated elsewhere that ‘relocation and compensation may not be 
appropriate in order comply with Article 27 of the Covenant’ (Concluding Observation 
1999: para. 22).  At the same time, the dissent in Ominayak  noted that ‘the right to enjoy 
one’s own culture should not be understood to imply that Band’s traditional way of life 
must be preserved at all costs’ (at Appendix 1). In essence, the rights of Indigenous 
peoples need to be balanced against economic development.  In Länsman the HRC did 
just this and quashed Article 27 claims on balancing this interest with that of economic 
development.  Specifically, the Sami minority in Finland claimed that the State violated 
their Article 27 right to enjoy their culture by authorizing quarrying works which 
disturbed their traditional reindeer-herding practices.  In assessing this claim, the HRC 
noted that ‘[t]he right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto but has to 
be placed in context’ (at para. 9.3).  In the context here, the HRC ultimately concluded 
that the quarrying did not have a duly detrimental effect on their cultural activities. In 
making this determination, the HRC balanced the interests of the Sami in reindeer-
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herding as a cultural activity with evidence presented by the State that demonstrated that 
it only permitted quarrying which would minimize the impact on these activities.   
Although the subject matter of these cases did not involve cultural property, the 
important point is that in assessing the claims of Indigenous peoples the HRC considered 
the interests of both parties and in considering these interests engaged in a balancing test.  
This suggests that if applied to the issue of cultural property, Article 27 would not serve 
as an absolute right to repatriation but would entail a more principled consideration of 
such requests in that it weighs the interests of both Indigenous peoples and current 
owners of disputed property.  For example, in weighing these interests the HRC could 
draw on the considerations of the aforementioned theories of cultural nationalism and 
internationalism, which underpin the regime for the protection of cultural property.  In 
terms of the former, the HRC would consider interests such as the importance of the 
cultural property to the identity of the requesting Indigenous peoples while in terms of the 
latter it would consider interests such as the access to and the preservation of cultural 
property.   
Ultimately, it is the language of Article 27 which provides the right of groups ‘to 
enjoy their own culture’ (ICCPR 1966: art. 27) that creates the possibility of this more 
just approach of balancing interests in that it allows room for the creation of alternative 
and creative solutions to such claims that still satisfy this right.  For instance, the right of 
Indigenous peoples to the enjoyment of culture could be satisfied by a solution that 
allows them to access their cultural property rather always requiring absolute repatriation. 
In the U.S. where the relevant legislation also does not provide an absolute and unfettered 
right to the repatriation of cultural property for Indigenous peoples,vii just such a solution 
of accessviii has proved an effective alternative.   
Conclusions 
The preceding is neither a polemic against nor a springboard for the argument that 
human rights law has no room for and does not require group, or more specifically, 
Indigenous rights.  Rather, what it does demonstrate is that international law does not 
need an absolute human right to the repatriation of cultural property for Indigenous 
peoples as provided by the Declaration as such a right necessarily fails to balance the 
interests of the parties involved in cultural property disputes.  Of course this rejection of 
an absolute right to repatriation of cultural property as understood by the Declaration 
suggests more broadly that the human rights regime should not always redress every 
historical injustice particular to Indigenous peoples. Yet on balance, the existing human 
rights framework provides more scope for redress of these injustices than the current 
regime for the protection of cultural property and its limited mechanism for repatriation 
available to Indigenous peoples.  Rather, it is the existing human rights framework that 
ultimately provides the best avenue for Indigenous efforts to repatriate cultural property.  
Specifically, it is this framework that creates the opportunity to balance the broader 
concerns of Indigenous peoples to redress historical injustices with the broader concerns 
of justice by considering the interests of all the parties concerned in repatriation debates. 
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i At the most basic level ‘Indigenous peoples are best defined as … groups traditionally 
regarded, and self-defined as descendants of the original inhabitants of lands with which 
they share a strong spiritual bond … [and they] desire to be culturally, socially and/or 
economically distinct from the dominate groups in society’ (Wiessner 1999: 60).  
ii The relevant portion of Article 11 provides that: ‘States shall provide redress through 
effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with 
Indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual 
property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs’ (Declaration 2007: art. 11(2)).  Article 12 continues and provides 
that Indigenous peoples have ‘the right to the repatriation of their human remains’ and so 
requires that ‘States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial 
objects and human remains in their possession…’ (Declaration 2007: arts. 12(1) and (2)).  
It is interesting to note that from the perspective of the framework for the protection of 
cultural property that the accepted definition of such property provided by the UNESCO 
Convention would include religious and spiritual property as well as ceremonial objects 
and human remains. Yet, this language of the Declaration appears to make these items 
distinct from cultural property.  In turn, cultural property in the Declaration presumably 
includes all cultural property as understood by the UNESCO Convention minus property 
of a religious and spiritual nature as well as ceremonial objects and human remains, 
though the Declaration clearly provides for their absolute and unfettered repatriation as 
well.  The remaining analysis focuses only on this understanding of cultural property as 
by Article 11 of the Declaration and its repatriation.   
iii Rachel Davis identifies Article 11 as a right of cultural integrity (Davis 2007: 9).  
iv Although a Declaration by the General Assembly does not on its own have legally 
binding effect unless it or individual articles within it can be said to reflect customary 
international law, the nearly unanimous adoption of this Declaration provides strong 
evidence of its likely development into customary law. (Davis 2007: 4-5). 
v The Declaration provides that all of the rights contained therein must be exercised ‘in 
accordance with the principles of justice … [and] respect for human rights…’ 
(Declaration 2007: art. 46). 
vi Article 27 provides that ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture…’ (ICCPR 
1966: art. 27). Although a minority right, the Human Rights Committee [HRC], the body 
charged with overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR, treats Indigenous peoples as a 
minority for the purposes of the application of Article 27 (General Comment 23 1994: 
paras. 3.2 and 7). 
vii  The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 [NAGPRA] 
divides cultural property into five different categories including human remains, 
associated funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects, scared objects and cultural 
patrimony.  NAGPRA only offers an absolute right to the repatriation of the first two 
categories of property.  The next two categories are subject to the normal right of 
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possession defense under common law while the last category is also subject to this 
defense but in a more limited fashion (NAGPRA 1990: §§ 3001-3013).  
viii In 2000, the American Museum of Natural History and the Confederated Tribes of the 
Grand Ronde Community of Oregon announced an out of court settlement that 
maintained the presence of a meteorite sacred to the tribes at the museum for purposes of 
science and education while ensuing access for the tribes to the meteorite for religious, 
historical, and cultural purposes (Thomas 2006: 233).  This settlement was reached in 
light of the fact that as a sacred object the meteorite would likely not be repatriated under 
NAGPRA.  
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